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I. Abstract
This paper researches the effects NAFTA has had on the relationship between
Mexico and the United States. It positions the question of why Mexico chose to enter the
agreement within a larger historical context, debating the economic and social effects on
the country as a whole. This study shows how economic trends have changed prior to
and since Mexico joined NAFTA. It elaborates on the specific dynamics of what it means
for the two countries to interact with each other on a cultural level, under the framework
explained by Geert Hofstede’s cultural dimensions. Then, it poses recommendations for
ways that managers and executives from the United States can use these cultural
understandings to avoid corporate-level miscommunications and missteps.
Because NAFTA is currently being renegotiated, this paper also discusses the
current state of affairs in regards to that process. With updates from as recently as May
4, 2018, the paper weighs possible outcomes of the renegotiations, taking into
consideration variables such as the elections occurring in both the United States and
Mexico before the end of the year. Finally, this paper concludes that the business
relationship between the two countries would not be as developed or as interdependent
as it is today without NAFTA.
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II. Introduction
The relationship that Mexico and the United States have now has been
developing for decades – realistically, these nations have been linked since their
inception. Prior to the current business relationship, the two countries were linked due
to other undeniable factors: the 2000 mile border they share; tourism, travel, and
migration; and certain environmental and health concerns that affect them both
(Villarreal, “U.S.-Mexico...”, 36). Over the last few decades, trade, production,
immigration, and more have contributed to strengthening the bond between these two
nations. However, these two countries have not always been so intertwined.
Beginning in the 1930s, Mexico maintained a strong protectionist attitude
towards business and trade with the rest of the world that lasted for almost 50 years.
Generally speaking, “protectionist” can be defined as advocating for “government
economic protection for domestic producers through restrictions on foreign
competitors” (“Protectionist”). The Mexican government’s goal was to stimulate its own
financial system without having to become too dependent on other nations to be
successful economically. The government established an import substitution policy,
hesitant to engage in import-export activity beyond what was immediately necessary.
This policy provided blanket protection for the entire national industrial sector, allowing
Mexican companies to focus on the production and sale of local products and services
within Mexican borders. The government also placed tight restrictions on foreign
investment, nationalized the oil industry, and strictly controlled the exchange rate of the
peso (Villarreal, “Mexico’s Free Trade…”, 113). Through these policies, the Mexican
government hoped to stimulate domestic-led industrialization, without having to rely on
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other nations to do so (Cid and Villarreal 133). Despite these efforts, this alone was not
enough to maintain economic stability or to effectively industrialize the nation.
By the 1980s, the negative effects of decades of protectionist policy in Mexico
became painfully evident. Hyperinflation was rising exponentially and had reached a
staggering rate of 180 percent in 1988 (Jessup and Jessup 4). The standard of living
across the country was rapidly declining throughout the decade into the early 1990s.
According to Jay and Maggie Jessup in Doing Business in Mexico, “overreliance on oil
revenues and a subsequent crash in oil prices put Mexico’s economy in a dangerous
situation” (3). Mexico’s history of poor economic decisions, coupled with the
government’s inability to meet its foreign debts, were the main contributing factors to
the subsequent financial crisis of 1982 and to the economic challenges the country faced
throughout the next decade. The government had exhausted all sources of financing,
and it was left with few choices to fix its situation. It was becoming clearer to the
government that the protectionist approach from the past 50 years was not having the
desired effects on the economy. As a result, severe downturn in economic stability
pushed the country to make a drastic policy change.
The Mexican government spent the next few years, between the debt crisis in
1982 and the signing of NAFTA in 1994, completely restructuring its approach to trade
barriers. The president at the time, Miguel de la Madrid, took active steps in order to
completely reverse these failed policies of the past. His new approach was to initiate a
plan to start opening and liberalizing the economy by replacing the outdated,
protectionist measures, such as the import substitution policy, with a more liberal trade
stance. The president hoped to boost foreign direct investment, lower trade barriers,
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and increase competitive advantage for non-oil exports (Cid and Villarreal 133). He
started to encourage more foreign trade and to release the tight grip on the value of the
peso. These measures were the first of many actions taken to guide the country towards
unilateral trade liberalization by the 1990s.
After the debt crisis in 1982, opening Mexico to trade liberalization was not just
an option, but a necessity. Thus, in 1986, the country became a part of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which was one of the government’s first steps
to a closer relationship with the United States (Cid and Villarreal 133). GATT was
originally drafted in 1947, with the purpose of “substantial reduction of tariffs and other
trade barriers and the elimination of preferences, on a reciprocal and mutually
advantageous basis” (“GATT/WTO”). This, combined with two other trade and
investment understandings – “The Framework of Principles and Procedures for
Consultation Regarding Trade and Investment Relations” entered in November 1987,
and “The Understanding Regarding Trade and Investment Facilitation Talks” entered in
October 1989 – paved the way for discussions about a formal, more specific free trade
agreement between the United States and Mexico (Cid and Villarreal 133). The 1987
agreement was the first legal governing framework between any two countries to
specifically oversee commercial relations. Both that and the 1989 “Understanding
Regarding Trade and Investment Facilitation Talks” helped to facilitate discussions
through which the countries could negotiate terms of trade alliances, work towards the
reduction of barriers, and the expansion of their trade-based relationship (Cid and
Villarreal 133). These two agreements, in conjunction with GATT, set an important
precedent, leading directly to the formation and perpetuation of an enduring business
relationship.
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On January 1, 1994, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) took
effect after being signed in 1993 by the former United States President Bill Clinton,
former Mexican President Carlos Salinas de Gortari, and former Canadian Prime
Minister Jean Chrétien. This agreement eliminated tariffs over time, as well as
establishing that “all duties and quantitative restrictions, with the exception of those on
a limited number of agricultural products traded with Canada, [to be] eliminated by
2008” (Office of the United States Trade Representative). NAFTA essentially ratified
into a transnational law the arrangements that had been outlined in previous trade
agreements and understandings, in order to further facilitate international commerce
between the countries of North America. It had the added incentive of eliminating taxes,
tariffs, duties, and quotas on transnational commerce and foreign direct investment
(FDI).
Once Mexico, Canada, and the United States signed NAFTA, the business
relationship specifically between Mexico and the United States flourished. Foreign
direct investment in Mexico increased as corporations from the United States started
setting up more factories and branch offices there. This was one of the objectives set by
Mexico’s previous president, Miguel de la Madrid, and his country was finally achieving
that goal. Many of these subsidiaries hired local employees to work under managers
from the United States, and they quickly learned about the cultural disconnect between
the way employees from the two countries operate. The key to making sure this new
venture was a successful one relied on the United States manager’s ability to adapt to
the changing business and cultural environments.
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III. Literature Review
As more data has been studied about the effects of NAFTA since it was signed
into law in 1994, researchers agree on what it has done to shape and improve the
Mexican economy. It is very easy to examine this agreement from an analytical
perspective, comparing numerical statistics and data from before and after Mexico
entered the accord. For example, according to the World Bank, the country’s gross
domestic product (GDP) in 1986 was US$129.44 billion. By 2014, it reached an all time
high of US$1.298 trillion (“Mexico,” World Bank Group). This incredible growth shows
an increase in economic development and stability. However, the effects that NAFTA
had on Mexico and the United States were not solely economic in nature; this agreement
and the subsequent relationship between the two nations also had environmental,
social, and political consequences. It is in these aspects that the experts differ in
opinion.
It is important to realize that, when discussing the impacts of NAFTA on the
Mexican economy, not every change and improvement is a direct result of the foreign
trade agreement. For example, Marisabel Cid and M. Angeles Villarreal agree that
“measuring the effects of NAFTA on the Mexican economy is difficult because the
economy was also affected by other factors, such as economic cycles in the United
States… and currency fluctuations” (Cid and Villarreal 131). These sources also agree
that, prior to NAFTA, the Mexican government’s reactions to the debt crisis of the early
1980s and its primary measures to move towards trade liberalization in the early 1990s
had a significant effect on the Mexican economy (Villarreal, “U.S.-Mexico...”, 40). As
previously mentioned, Mexico and the United States were connected prior to signing
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NAFTA; because they are so closely linked, they are bound to impact one another
outside of the trade agreement as well.
Another example of factors outside the scope of NAFTA’s commercial impact is
migration. Long before the trade agreement took effect, both documented and
undocumented immigrants were traveling across the border between the United States
and Mexico in both directions. These immigrants affect both nations economically,
socially, culturally, and politically. When Mexican immigrants arrive in the United
States, they influence consumer trends, work for lower wages at jobs native citizens do
not want, and open stores and restaurants authentic to their culture. When these
immigrants settle in a new country, the Mexican population decreases, their consumer
dollars are spent elsewhere, and they contribute to a completely different society. Many
immigrants also send remittances, or portions of their income, back to their families in
Mexico to help them support themselves. When it comes to more recent political
sentiments, it may seem as though many people from the United States have a strong
anti-immigration attitude for a variety of reasons, including the supposed threat
immigrants pose to the job market, harsh stereotypes about drug use, and more.
However, the truth is that only 27% of people from the United States view immigrants as
“a burden on our country because they take our jobs, housing and health care” while
63% believe “immigrants today strengthen our country because of their hard work and
talents” (Bowman). Regardless of the opinion of people from the United States, Mexican
immigration to the United States existed before NAFTA was signed, and it is only
natural that these immigration patterns would continue to occur and to increase after it
took effect as well.
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Since Mexico signed on as a part of NAFTA, the country’s economy has
transformed from developing, agricultural-based, and protectionist into a successful
manufacturing-for-export operation. Many economists that are analyzing the effects of
NAFTA have chosen to examine exports and imports as a way to measure the impact on
the economy. For example, M. Angeles Villarreal et. al. agree that, each year since the
agreement took effect, exports represent an increasingly larger percentage of Mexico’s
GDP (Villarreal, “U.S.-Mexico...”, 38). This shows that, since signing NAFTA, Mexico’s
import and export activities have contributed increasingly more money to the nation’s
economy. On page 41 of the Appendix, two infographics from the Observatory of
Economic Complexity detail exactly which industries comprise the majority of Mexico’s
import and export activities, and what percentage they contribute to the USD$374
billion worth of exports and the USD$380 billion worth of imports exchanged in 2016
(“Mexico”, OEC). This shows which specific industries produce the most sought-after
goods and services, and to what extent each one contributed. For example, machinery
and transportation are two of the top contributors for both exports and imports;
machinery contributed 37% of total goods exported, and 39% of total goods imported
(“Mexico”, OEC).
More specifically, in 2016 - which is the most recent data available - imports to
Mexico represented 39.95% of the total GDP (“Imports of Goods and Services (% of
GDP)”). In the same year, exports represented 38.16% of the total GDP (“Exports of
Goods and Services (% of GDP)”). This growth in international commerce shows a major
improvement from the data from 1993, the year before NAFTA took effect: that year,
imports to Mexico represented a mere 13.82% of the total GDP (“Imports of Goods and
Services (% of GDP)”). That same year, exports represented only 12.14% of the total GDP
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(“Exports of Goods and Services (% of GDP)”). The statistics from 2016 show that a
combined total of almost 80% of Mexico’s GDP comes from their international trade
activities. Without NAFTA, Mexico’s GDP and economic stability would not have grown
to be as strong as they are today. Additionally, since both have been increasing in the
years following NAFTA, this is evidence that the trade agreement has helped to
stimulate Mexico’s economy and has fostered the country’s development.
When it comes to measuring the success of NAFTA, another effective way is to
examine the data surrounding foreign direct investment (FDI) because, prior to signing
the agreement, Mexico was wary of foreign investment of any kind. Foreign direct
investment “consists of investments in real estate, manufacturing plants, and retail
facilities in which the foreign investor owns 10% or more of the entity” (“Mexico Foreign
Direct Investment”). FDI is important to the country’s economy because it provides a
reason for a stronger power, like the United States, to be more conscientious of the
financial strength of the country in which they’ve invested – otherwise their investments
were for naught. At the end of 1993, right before NAFTA took effect, the United States
FDI in Mexico was USD$1720.6 million (“Mexico Foreign Direct Investment”). By July
1994, that number spiked up to USD$3283.4 million, and in December 2017, this
number reached USD$5903.8 million (“Mexico Foreign Direct Investment”). Villarreal
et. al. also agree that this growth in FDI may have occurred without NAFTA’s influence,
as “Mexico likely would have continued to liberalize its foreign investment laws with or
without NAFTA” (Villarreal, “U.S.-Mexico...”, 40). This is evident from the economic
steps the Mexican government took prior to signing NAFTA. However, this specific
trade agreement truly facilitated foreign direct investment, especially in cities on the
border between the United States and Mexico.

Molinaro 13
One of the aspects of NAFTA that sources debate are the impacts of
maquiladoras on the country; economic experts will have one argument, while
sociocultural analysts will pose another. “Maquiladora” is the word used to describe
“labor-intensive foreign-owned industries which assemble products for export to other
countries” (Kras 21). Assuming these maquiladoras are established by United States
companies, they are typically set up in border cities, since transportation costs for the
parent company would be lower, and the staff employed at headquarters would have
easier access to the satellite buildings. These maquiladoras did in fact exist before
NAFTA; the first were opened in 1965 to balance the jobs lost by the end of the Bracero
Program (Mueller 132). This program was an early cooperation between the United
States and Mexico to provide cheap agricultural labor to the United States, but it ended
in 1964 (Mueller 132). However, after NAFTA was signed, there were multiple factors
that resulted in the opening of more maquiladoras, and in turn, pushed more Mexican
people to move to the border cities. As a result of NAFTA, many people operating small
or medium-sized farms in the rural regions of Mexico could no longer compete with the
larger scale operations exporting to the United States, so many were forced to shut down
and seek other employment. Because of this, many people – especially young, poor,
uneducated women from rural areas – moved to these border cities for work in the
maquiladoras (Mueller 133).
From an economic perspective, the maquiladoras are believed to be “an
important part of United States corporate strategy in achieving competitively priced
goods in the world marketplace” (Villarreal, “U.S.-Mexico Economic Relations”, 41).
Many economists agree that outsourcing production to Mexico, where labor, resources,
and real estate are cheaper, is a smart move for a company. Others would argue that the
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maquiladora industry is hurting the United States job market, since moving production
south of the border would result in a job loss for United States workers. However, what
both of these standpoints miss are the detrimental social effects that the maquiladora
industry has had on Mexican citizens and, primarily, Mexican women.
In the book titled The Maquiladora Reader: Cross-border Organizing Since
NAFTA, editors Rachael Kamel and Anya Hoffman compiled and published the stories
of little-known negative effects of the maquiladora boom that occured post-NAFTA. It is
important to note, as they have at the beginning of chapter 2, that “women constitute a
large majority of the maquiladora workforce...constituting up to 70 percent of the
workforce in light assembly industries and 57 percent overall” (Kamel and Hoffman 21).
Additionally, the undervaluation of female labor is eminent in the treatment of female
maquiladora workers: many of these women struggled with “low wages, long hours, and
poor health conditions” while trying to provide for their families (Kamel and Hoffman
21). Some of these women are single mothers, working an early shift at the
maquiladoras followed by a second job in the evening, but even those with partners
struggled to manage all of their responsibilities and “lack a strong support network, as
many are migrants from Mexico’s interior who have left everything behind in order to
earn a meager wage” (Kamel and Hoffman 22). These women already have “fewer
options for paid employment than men, face the overt or tacit threat of violence both
inside and outside of the home, and bear the lion’s share of responsibility for caring for
children, the elderly, and the sick” but, on top of that, “maquiladora women are also
subject to sexual violence and abuse” (Kamel and Hoffman 21). Evidently, Kamel et al.
would not agree with the economists’ standpoint that these maquiladoras are entirely
beneficial for the well-being of the Mexican citizens who work there.
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Carol Mueller, author of the section of Binational Human Rights: The U.S.Mexico Experience entitled “The Binational Roots of the Femicides in Ciudad Juárez”,
would also disagree with the economists that say the maquiladoras had a positive effect
on Mexico as a country. In her chapter, she discusses a series of brutal attacks against
women and violent murders of women in Mexican border towns and cities. According to
Teresa Rodríguez, Diana Montané, and Lisa Pulitzer in The Daughters of Juárez: A
True Story of Serial Murder South of the Border, “an alarming number [of these
victims] were abducted en route to their jobs at the assembly plants … that made parts
and appliances for export” (2). Many of these murders were concentrated in cities like
Ciudad Juárez, a city with an especially large number of maquiladoras. Companies like
“Lear, Amway, TDK, Honeywell, General Electric, 3M, DuPont, and Kenwood” had
established factories in Ciudad Juárez in response to NAFTA (Rodríguez et al. 2).
When analyzing the effects of NAFTA, especially when evaluating the impacts of
maquiladoras, the victims of these types of attacks are not typically given the
consideration they deserve. These femicides are characterized by the treatment of
victims: generally speaking, most victims were young women who “were kidnapped,
held captive and subjected to brutal sexual violence before being killed,” and that
violence included (but was not limited to) “rape, biting, beatings, stab wounds and
mutilation” (Mueller 129). For most of these victims, their suffering was brought to an
end by a death either from strangulation, or from injuries caused by physical blows. The
general sense of Mueller’s article is that Ciudad Juárez post-NAFTA created the perfect
storm for so many femicides to take place. However, it is important to remember that,
much like most other changes that occurred after Mexico joined the trade agreement,
the conditions that existed which allowed so many femicides to take place are not solely
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attributable to NAFTA or to the United States’ intervention in Mexico. As I will explain
later, these attacks are part of a larger systematic aggression towards Mexican women
that was largely enabled by the culture’s misogynistic tendencies, and the increase in
attacks was only further facilitated by the uncontrollable development from increased
United States involvement.
IV. Research Question
I have been fascinated by Latin American culture and history since high school.
When choosing to come to Pace as an international management major, I was thrilled to
be able to focus on Latin America as a region. Since making that decision, I’ve learned
more about how business practices vary there, specifically in Mexico. Because NAFTA is
a highly debated issue with the current United States administration, I think it is
important to look at how it has affected the current business world while considering the
possible effects to come.
The research question I developed is: “How Has NAFTA Affected the Business
Relationship Between the United States and Mexico?” I focused on using economic
statistics to show that, before NAFTA, Mexico was struggling financially, but the trade
agreement helped set the country on the path towards economic success. I
demonstrated that the business relationship between the United States and Mexico was
completely facilitated by NAFTA. Furthermore, I highlighted that business management
styles are heavily linked to the culture and the history of a nation, because these nuances
need to be understood to promote successful international business.
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V. Methodology
Throughout my research process, I consulted a wide array of sources to collect
data, including books, scholarly articles, case studies, and other similar types of
resources. I amalgamated economic, political, social, and cultural information to analyze
and include in my final paper. One cannot analyze the effects of an international
agreement such as NAFTA without considering each of these aspects in conjunction
with each other, because it is impossible to get a complete understanding of those effects
otherwise.
In terms of the cultural information that I collected, I positioned it under a
framework known as Geert Hofstede’s cultural dimensions. Hofstede was an IBM
employee and is a social psychologist who developed a set of six different dimensions
through which one can analyze and compare different cultures. The first is the Power
Distance index, or the PDI. This index expresses the degree to which a social hierarchy
is understood and accepted by those at the bottom – or, alternatively, how a society
handles inequality among its people. The second is Individualism vs. Collectivism. This
dimension expresses the mentality of a society; are they more tightly or loosely knit? Do
they place more importance on the “me” or on the “we”? The third dimension is
Masculinity vs. Femininity. This represents whether a culture is more tough and
competitive, or consensus-driven and emotionally motivated. The fourth dimension is
the Uncertainty Avoidance index (UAI). This explains how comfortable or
uncomfortable a society is when it comes to taking risks, ambiguity, and dealing with the
fact that the future can never truly be predicted. The fifth dimension is Long-term vs.
Short-term Orientation. This dimension compares countries that prefer to operate based

Molinaro 18
on traditions and norms to countries that embrace more creativity and are more open to
trying new things when it comes to preparing for the future. Finally, the sixth and final
dimension is Indulgence vs. Restraint. This details a country’s tendency to accept a more
carefree way of life or a tendency to stick to strict social norms (“National Culture”).
Together, these dimensions were used to develop a cultural profile of Mexico that can be
used to compare the country to others, analyze the results of that comparison, and apply
them to this thesis for education and understanding.
VI. Results & Discussion
Throughout my research for this paper, I have found that it is an undeniable fact
that NAFTA had a positive impact on the Mexican economy and the financial stability of
the nation. Because of this trade agreement, foreign direct investment in Mexico has
increased, as other countries are attracted by corporate-level tax exemption and relaxed
labor and environmental laws for which they are responsible, as well as cheaper labor
and real estate. Mexico’s gross domestic product has also increased, and import and
export activities have become a stronger contributor to the total GDP. Mexico has
largely been transformed from a developing nation to an industrialized, manufacturingfor-export economy. Over the last 25 years or so, the relationship between Mexico and
the United States has also been growing and evolving in several ways: imports and
exports between the two countries have increased as a result of the trade agreement, and
as technology has advanced, the types of materials exchanged between the two nations
has changed; the United States’ foreign direct investment in Mexico has grown; and the
cultures have become even more closely linked.
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One way to analyze the changing economic relationship between the United
States and Mexico is to look at exports and imports exchanged between the two nations.
This represents only a portion of Mexico’s total import/export activity, and the way this
portion changes is a helpful indicator of Mexico’s relationship with the United States.
According to the Observatory of Economic Complexity (also referred to by the acronym
OEC), an interactive visual tool devised by researchers at MIT to convey information
about international trade and commerce, 62% of Mexico’s exports in 1962 – the first
year they have data from – went to the United States (“Mexico”, OEC). That same year,
63% of products that Mexico imported came from the United States (“Mexico”, OEC).
By 1996, two years after Mexico became a part of NAFTA, 79% of exports were bound
for the United States, and 76% of imports were of US origin (“Mexico”, OEC). The most
recent data from 2016 shows that 81% of Mexican exports are shipped to the United
States, while a mere 46% of their imports come from the United States (“Mexico”, OEC).
Below, another graph from the OEC provides a comprehensive visual of how Mexican
exports have changed since 1962. It shows how the total value of exports have increased
over time, while also showing the percentage of exports each country receives. One can
see how much Mexico’s trade relationship with the United States has grown over the last
few decades.
The OEC data highlights an interesting occurrence: before and after Mexico
joined NAFTA, exports to the United States as a percentage of total Mexican exports
increased by 17%, while the import percentage increased by 13%. In the 20 years
between 1996 and 2016, the data shows only a 2% increase in the percentage of exports
shipped to the United States and a 30% decrease in the percentage of imports from the
United States. What this suggests is that, while NAFTA really did foster the nation’s
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import-export activities, Mexico has been able to diversify its portfolio of international
trading partners. This diversification is key for Mexico, especially considering how
concerned the government has been, historically speaking, about maintaining its
economic autonomy and avoiding financial dependency on one specific nation.
However, this data also shows that Mexico is still very closely linked to the United States
in terms of trade, and would face very drastic economic consequences should anything
threaten or disrupt that relationship.
Analysts have tried to measure the effects of NAFTA on Mexico through growth
in certain economic trends, specifically in terms of gross domestic product (GDP).
According to the researchers at CEIC Data – a Euromoney Institutional Investor
Company – Mexico’s nominal GDP has been, on average, increasing since the country
joined NAFTA (“Mexico Nominal GDP”). Nominal GDP is the GDP evaluated at current
market prices, which accounts for inflation; in simpler terms, the GDP is evaluated in
terms of what USD$1 is worth today, to provide a more accurate comparison and
analysis. In March 1993, about 10 months before NAFTA took effect, the nominal GDP
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was USD$121.1 million. By October 2008, this number more than doubled to reach
USD$335.3 million (“Mexico Nominal GDP”). More recent data shows that it is
declining again; however, as of December 2017, the nominal GDP is still much better
than it was before NAFTA, recorded as USD$293.5 million (“Mexico Nominal GDP”).
Joining NAFTA had more than just an economic effect on the relationship
between the United States and Mexico; there were also important social and cultural
changes that occurred. Some of these societal changes came about because of the
increase in foreign direct investment in terms of United States-owned factories. The
expansion and growth of these factories, for example, are directly correlated to an
increase of mistreatment of Mexican women, especially when it comes to the rate of
femicides. The World Health Organization (WHO) released a document detailing
femicides, in which they define it as an intentional murder of a woman, “usually
perpetrated by men […], partners or ex-partners, and involve ongoing abuse in the
home, threats or intimidation, sexual violence or situations where women have less
power or fewer resources than their partner” (“Femicide”). This publication divides
femicides into four different types: intimate femicide, murders in the name of ‘honor’
(also known as honor killings), dowry-related femicide, and non-intimate femicide.
Most femicides that have occurred in Mexico qualify as as non-intimate, which is
described as “femicide involving sexual aggression” committed by “someone without an
intimate relationship with the victim” (“Femicide”). The article also points out that,
while this class of femicide can be random, “there are disturbing examples of systematic
murders of women, particularly in Latin America” (“Femicide”). The femicides in
Mexico’s border towns such as Ciudad Juárez, which increased in number after the FDI
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from United States-based companies also increased, are a prime example of these
systematic murders.
The femicides that occurred on the border between the United States and Mexico
were part of a larger, systematic societal breakdown. The increase in the amount of
femicide victims in Mexico after NAFTA cannot be solely attributed to an increase in
United States involvement. Between drug cartels and a corrupt law enforcement, a
mentality perpetuated by the misogynistic “machismo” culture that these victims were
worthless anyway, and the shifts towards urbanization and industrialization in the job
market – this part mostly motivated by United States influence – it is no surprise that so
many women became victims. A large percentage of these victims were attracted to
these border cities to work in the maquiladoras, which is one of the factors that made
them such easy targets. These maquiladoras were getting built so rapidly that the city’s
growth was almost impossible to map; therefore, it was becoming increasingly easier for
individuals to get lost on the “hodgepodge of paved and unpaved streets, some marked,
others anonymous sandy paths that led to the shantytowns and squatters’ villages
continually springing up on the outskirts of town” (Rodríguez et al. 3). It also became
increasingly easy for those looking for victims to conceal themselves and surprise their
prey.
The unfortunate truth is that these femicides are still plaguing Mexico. According
to United Nations officials based there, the country “ranks among the world’s 20 worst
countries for violence against women” (Matloff). There were almost 4,000 femicides in
2012 and 2013 alone (Matloff). Many of these victims were dumped in mass graves,
while others turned up as unidentified female body parts. For too many, their mutilated
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bodies were never returned to their families. Some may argue that these deaths were
collateral damage – especially those who favor the maquiladoras – but the reality is that
“there was no inevitability about this outcome” (Mueller 145). Even if these femicides
were a result of systematic problems and were not entirely inevitable, the total number
of victims did not need to increase to such a high level.
Another form of social impact that is important to examine are the differences
between Mexican culture and United States culture, and how this affects the workplace
in a globalized era. Because so many companies operate on an international scale now, it
is important for an employee to understand the nuances of other cultures with which
they interact, or they are less likely to be successful in the global business circle.
Understanding one’s own culture is easy; however, it is much more difficult to learn how
to interact with other cultures without assuming the superiority of one’s own.
As can be seen in the chart below, the United States and Mexico score very
differently on all but two of Geert Hofstede’s cultural dimensions.

In terms of Masculinity and Long-term orientation (LTO), the two nations score very
similarly – Mexico rates a 69 on the Masculinity scale while the United States falls at a
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62. Alternatively, Mexico scores a 24 on the LTO scale while the United States only
receives a 26 (“Country Comparison”). The masculinity score shows that both countries
are fairly masculine in nature; most people have a “live to work” attitude, and
“managers are expected to be decisive and assertive” (“Country Comparison”). Mexico’s
masculinity score is far from surprising.
There is a concept known as machismo that is highly prevalent in Mexican
culture. Machismo is a societal value, which explains why men feel the need to be
stereotypically and excessively masculine, while having a great sense of male pride. This
concept is typically what confines Mexicans to the gender dichotomy that men are
supposed to be the breadwinners and that they should provide for their family, while
women are expected to tend to the home, care for the children, and do what their
husbands say. In the chapter explaining cultural traits in Management in Two Cultures,
Kras points out that “the mother is subservient and seeks the advice and authority of her
husband in all major matters. She is expected to be a devoted mother and obedient wife”
(Kras 23). However, in a time of economic distress, many of these women were expected
to get a job in addition to their responsibilities at home. As described by the editors of
The Maquiladora Reader, “even in most marriages both partners have to work” in order
for the family unit to be able to support itself (Kamel and Hoffman 21). This is one of the
contributing factors to the sexism that the maquiladora workers and the femicide
victims experience. Women were already seen as secondary to their husbands, they were
not valued as part of the labor force, and they did not feel as though they had a right to
advocate for themselves or to challenge their male supervisors or to their husbands.

Molinaro 25
The LTO score highlights that both cultures are comprised of relatively normative
thinkers: “people in such societies have a strong concern with establishing the absolute
Truth” (“Country Comparison”). Citizens of both nations have a high respect for
traditions, “a relatively small propensity to save for the future, and a focus on achieving
quick results” (“Comparison”). This could be good for managers to know, because it
would aid them in motivating their Mexican employees in ways they relate to, such as
with family-oriented bonuses, more flexible work hours, and more. It would also assist
in decisions regarding hiring and task delegation; it may be helpful for a hiring manager
or a higher-up to know that a candidate is naturally driven to achieve results quickly and
efficiently.
Mexico and the United States do not score so similarly for every cultural
dimension. When it comes to individualism, for example, Mexico was rated at a 30 while
the United States scored much higher, at a 91 (“Country Comparison”). This shows that
Mexico is a collectivist society, which can be explained as having a “long-term
commitment to the member ‘group’, be that a family, extended family, or extended
relationships” (“Country Comparison”). On the other hand, the United States’s
incredibly high score of 91 means that most people from the United States lean towards
the “lone wolf” stereotype. This disparity can create obstacles for managers from the
United States, who do not understand the collectivist mentality and are rooted in the
ways of their own individualism. For example, managers from the United States “should
expect occasional absences when there is illness in the family. In general, they should be
alert to the possibility of finding in family ties and concerns an explanation for behavior
they don’t understand” (Kras 62). Also, these managers may see a lot of family members
working for the same company. This is because “hiring practices strongly favor relatives
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and friends of employees”, since Mexican employers value very highly “trustworthiness,
loyalty, and reliability” (Kras 50). Oftentimes, Mexican employees are likely to
recommend their relative for a position, and because familial ties are directly associated
with one’s character, these recommendations are regarded very highly.
In terms of Power Distance, the United States scored a 40 while Mexico scored an
81. This shows that Mexicans accept their hierarchical society, and that they are more
likely to have inherent respect for their superiors. Employees and managers from the
United States, however, are more apt to throw caution to the wind and try to dismantle
or change the hierarchical structure. This difference can also cause frustration for
managers from the United States, especially when it comes to delegating work or having
Mexican employees working in a team; if a manager assigns someone from a culture
that scores higher on the PDI to lead a team, that person will be more likely to still feel
obligated to ask the manager’s opinion and permission throughout the project.
With Uncertainty Avoidance, the United States was rated at 46 while Mexico
scored an 82. This means that Mexico has a high preference to shy away from
uncertainty and risks, while people from the United States typically encourage more
risky behavior. While Mexican employees may prefer to avoid uncertainty, they do tend
to enjoy abstract thinking and theorizing. As Kras explains, “This is one of the most
important areas of adjustment for Mexican managers. It is essential for them to make
the difficult transition from abstract theorizing to a more practical approach” (65). She
recommends that executives from the United States try to spur some risk taking, and
“can help them by implementing carefully conceived management development
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programs” (Kras 65). In addition to this tactic, continuous encouragement and
constructive, well-phrased criticism is also helpful.
Finally, with indulgence, Mexico scored a 97 while the United States scored a 68,
which highlights that Mexican culture has a tendency to adopt a more carefree way of
life, trending towards optimism, while the United States is quite different from this
(“Country Comparison”). People from the United States are often more restrained,
especially when it comes to business matters. This dimension can be seen in the way
managers speak with subordinates. For example, managers from the United States are
more likely to openly and brusquely tell subordinates when they have done something
wrong, while Mexican managers take care to have a more optimistic, constructive
approach. As explained in Management in Two Cultures, managers from the United
States need to “resist saying outright, ‘You are wrong.’ Mexicans know perfectly well
when they have made a mistake, but verbalizing it puts them to shame and is liable to
make them withdraw. On the other hand, it is important for U.S. executives to admit
when they are wrong because this will go a long way in demonstrating to the Mexican
that they are also human” (Kras 63). It is essential that managers from the United States
are able to grasp and employ this concept when providing feedback, or they run the risk
of alienating their Mexican subordinates.
While there are obviously cultural aspects not covered in the Hofstede method,
this is a very expansive list, helping businesspeople get a sense of others with whom they
may eventually interact. It is important for employees as well as managers and
executives to see where these cultural differences lie, so as not to offend and to avoid
making a bad first impression, because these missteps can affect the success of the
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business relationship as a whole. When Mexico joined NAFTA, an immediate pressure
was placed on understanding these cultural nuances and using them to inform business
decisions, which is not as easy as it seems. It is very hard to work past one’s own biases,
prejudices, and implications, but in order to foster a successful business relationship, it
is of the utmost importance that people understand these cultural differences.
These cultural differences are particularly relevant now, as the member countries
of NAFTA are engaging in renegotiations after signing the original agreement almost 25
years ago. At the time this paper was written, only a few chapters out of the 30 that
comprise the agreement have been finalized, and the overall outcome is still unknown.
However, as of May 2nd, Texas Agriculture Commissioner Sid Miller “says he expects
the North American Free Trade Agreement renegotiations to wrap up within the next
couple of weeks” (Sandoval Jr. and Taylor). However, both Mexico and the United
States have elections on the horizon before the end of the year; United States midterm
elections will take place in November, while the Mexican presidential election is
scheduled for July 1st.
The outcome of the midterm elections in the United States “could change the
timeline [...] to sign a deal,” especially since current Mexican president Enrique Peña
Nieto is not eligible for re-election (Chiriguayo). According to Bloomberg’s poll tracking
system, candidate Andrés Manuel López Obrador is currently leading “with the backing
of about 47% of likely voters,” while his closest competitor ranks at under 30%
(“Mexican Election Coverage”). Because López Obrador is a leftist candidate, many
multinational executives familiar with Mexico’s economy “fear that his populist
programs (such as to implement massive increases in social spending while eschewing
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tax increases) would severely destabilize Mexico’s already fragile public finances, and
that his opposition to the current administration’s structural reforms [...] will drive
down investments in the market, cause further peso devaluations, and lead to greater
confrontation with the Trump Administration” (Martinez 3). Considering the public
statements President Trump has made regarding his personal feelings about NAFTA,
mostly via his Twitter feed, it is easy to see why Mexican executives may have concerns
about how these two leaders would interact. A specific example has been included
below.

Tweets like these promote harmful stereotypes about Mexican people. These tweets, in
conjunction with Trump’s campaign - which was rooted in building a border wall
between Mexico and the United States - one can see why electing a more liberal Mexican
president may be cause for concern in regards to transnational communication.
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NAFTA is not only being renegotiated because of Trump’s campaign promises
and Twitter threats. Over the past 25 years since the agreement was drafted, the
member countries have experienced vast amounts of growth and change, and
multinational executives have become increasingly aware of the need for a
modernization of the agreement. For example, some of today’s largest industries are
underrepresented in the original agreement, and deserve to be incorporated, including
“industries that were relatively nascent when NAFTA was first negotiated (such as ecommerce and the digital industry), industries that were nationalized at the time (such
as Mexico’s energy sector), or industries in the service sector (such as the insurance,
accounting, and express delivery industries” (Martinez 3). In this sense, the opportunity
for renegotiation of NAFTA’s terms is a positive one, because “these changes would
allow for greater standardization across borders, allowing for better access to each
other’s markets and increased trade” (Martinez 4). Other companies have been vocal
about changes they would like to see made to the agreement: some call for “process
improvements and better infrastructure at the border to reduce costs to import,” while
others support “greater standardization across borders, with stronger intellectual
property protections and enforcement of regulatory standards” (Martinez 3). However,
these modernization measures seem to be diametrically opposed to the protectionist
rhetoric that Trump has employed since the beginning of his campaign.
It is difficult for anyone to be certain about the outcome of this renegotiation
until it is finalized. Despite that, multinational corporations have to start planning for
any situation, or they run the risk of losing business and revenue if they are unable to
keep up with the changes. Antonio Martinez, the Director of Global Economics Research
at Frontier Strategy Group, wrote an article for the Harvard Business Review entitled
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“What a Changing NAFTA Could Mean for Doing Business in Mexico” in which he
examines the two most likely outcomes, how they will affect the next two years for
businesses operating in Mexico, and the strategies that are being utilized by companies
that anticipate each outcome.
The first scenario is one where López Obrador gets elected, and the “prolonged
and contentious” renegotiations “fuel depreciation of the Mexican peso and reduce
investment” (Martinez 5). In this outcome, called “A long period of populist-driven
uncertainty”, the Mexican peso would depreciate from its current rate of 19.23 MXP/US
$1 to 22 MXP/US $1 over the next two years (Martinez 5). The corporations expecting
this outcome have halted any major investments they may have had planned, including
new factories and distribution centers; they have also “pursued a cautious approach to
price increases (despite rising pressure on margins from a stronger dollar), and
increased investments in monitoring customer spending patterns and on lobbying and
regulatory support in Mexico and the United States” (Martinez 5). The companies
planning for this outcome are adopting a more conservative plan in the event that a
more liberal approach to international trade does not work in their favor.
The alternate scenario, called “The status quo persists,” the candidate from the
center-right party, now known to be Ricardo Anaya, is elected instead of López Obrador.
However, in this outcome, “NAFTA negotiations remain undecided beyond Mexico’s
2018 elections,” but the economic effects are not as drastic as in the previous scenario:
“the Mexican peso would likely only depreciate to 20.5 MXP/US $1 over the next two
years” and the economy will experience more growth (Martinez 5). The executives
anticipating this scenario “are continuing to encourage corporate headquarters to invest
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in the Mexican market, while monitoring the evaluation of trade talks and resourcing
lobbying efforts in Mexico and the United States” (Martinez 5). This outcome is more
favorable economically than the previous one, but those that support this hypothesis
have more to lose if their predictions were false and they continue to make investments.
VII. Conclusion
Considering all aspects discussed in this paper, it is clear that there has been an
enormous amount of progress, especially in terms of the economy, after Mexico joined
NAFTA in 1994. The country’s GDP and FDI inside its borders have risen tremendously;
money earned from exports and imports is, on average, rising; and the number of
Mexico’s frequent trading partners is increasing as a result of signing the trade
agreement. Mexico has become a much stronger economic power in the global business
sphere over the last few decades. Judging by its economic growth and success, the
nation has reached the point where it is strong enough to be a well-equipped competitor
in the international trade markets, and has diversified its trading portfolio enough to
reduce dependency on one specific nation – which was one of the Mexican government’s
main concerns when it first adopted the protectionist trade policy in the 1930s.
However, not all of the effects of NAFTA membership were positive. For example,
the country’s agricultural system completely shifted from farming to feed the country, to
farming to competitively export to other nations. This led to small farmers being bought
out or forced off their land, which led to the increase in urbanization. This may seem
like a positive effect; however, at the rate at which the cities expanded, the infrastructure
and housing networks could not expand fast enough to keep up with the growing
population rates. Therefore, thousands of women who moved to these cities to work in
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maquiladoras were brutally attacked and murdered each year, with a large percentage of
bodies that remain missing to this day. These murders are still plaguing Mexican cities
at alarming rates. Regardless of whether the impacts were positive or negative, it is
important to recognize that they were incubated and facilitated by the terms of NAFTA.
Without this trade agreement, these occurrences would not have happened as rapidly or
as widespread as they have.

Molinaro 34
Works Cited
Bowman, Karlyn. “Reading The Polls: Welcome To America? What Americans Say
About Immigration.” Forbes, Forbes Magazine, 16 Feb. 2017,
https://www.forbes.com/sites/bowmanmarsico/2017/02/14/reading-the-pollswelcome-to-america-what-americans-say-about-immigration/#7a69ac6724e6.
Chiriguayo, Danielle. “Where Do NAFTA Renegotiations Stand?” Marketplace, 10 Apr.
2018,

www.marketplace.org/2018/04/10/economy/nafta-explained/where-do-

nafta-negotiations-currently-stand.
Cid, Marisabel and M. Angeles Villarreal. “NAFTA and the Mexican Economy.” Mexico:
Background and Issues, by Richard C. Bradley, Nova Science, 2011, pp. 131-148.
“Country Comparison: Mexico and the United States.” Hofstede Insights, Hofstede
Insights, www.hofstede-insights.com/country-comparison/mexico,the-usa/.
“Exports of Goods and Services (% of GDP).” The World Bank Data, The World Bank,
www.data.worldbank.org/indicator/NE.EXP.GNFS.ZS?locations=MX.
“Femicide.” World Health Organization, World Health Organization, 28 Nov. 2014,
www.who.int/reproductivehealth/publications/violence/rhr12_38/en/.
“GATT/WTO.” Duke University Goodson Law Library, Duke University,
http://law.duke.edu/lib/researchguides/gatt/.
“Imports of Goods and Services (% of GDP).” The World Bank Data, The World Bank,
www.data.worldbank.org/indicator/NE.IMP.GNFS.ZS?locations=MX.
Jessup, Jay M., and Maggie L. Jessup. Doing Business in Mexico. Prima Pub., 1993.
Kamel, Rachael, and Anya Hoffman, editors. The Maquiladora Reader: Cross-Border
Organizing Since NAFTA. Mexico-U.S. Border Program, American Friends Service
Committee, 1999.

Molinaro 35
Kras, Eva S. Management in Two Cultures: Bridging the Gap Between U.S. and
Mexican Managers. Revised ed., Intercultural Press, 1995.
Martinez, Antonio. "What a Changing NAFTA Could Mean for Doing Business in
Mexico." Harvard Business Review Digital Articles, 20 June 2017, pp. 2-6.
EBSCOhost,
rlib.pace.edu/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db
=buh&AN=123809483&site=eds-live&scope=site.
Matloff, Judith. “Six Women Murdered Each Day as Femicide in Mexico Nears a
Pandemic.” Al Jazeera America, Al Jazeera America, LLC, 4 Jan. 2015,
http://america.aljazeera.com/multimedia/2015/1/mexico-spandemicfemicides.html
“Mexican Election Coverage.” Edited by Carlos M Rodriguez et al., Bloomberg.com,
Bloomberg, 4 May 2018, www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2018-mexicanelection/.
“Mexico.” Edited by Alexander Simoes, OEC: The Observatory of Economic
Complexity, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, atlas.media.mit.edu/en/.
“Mexico Foreign Direct Investment.” Trading Economics, Trading Economics,
www.tradingeconomics.com/mexico/foreign-direct-investment.
“Mexico.” Kiss, Bow, or Shake Hands: The Bestselling Guide to Doing Business in More
Than 60 Countries, by Terri Morrison and Wayne A. Conway, 2nd ed., Adams
Media, 2006, pp. 313-322.
“Mexico.” Mexico, World Bank Group. Data.worldbank.org/country/mexico.
“Mexico Nominal GDP.” CEIC Data, CEIC.
www.ceicdata.com/en/indicator/mexico/nominal-gdp.

Molinaro 36
Mueller, Carol M. “The Binational Roots of the Femicides in Ciudad Juarez.” Binational
Human Rights: The U.S.-Mexico Experience, by William P. Simmons, University
of Pennsylvania Press, 2014, pp. 129-161.
“National Culture.” Hofstede Insights, Hofstede Insights,
www.hofstede-insights.com/models/national-culture/.
Office of the United States Trade Representative. “North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA).” Office of the United States Trade Representative,
http://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/north-american-freetrade-agreement-nafta.
“Protectionist.” Merriam-Webster.com. Merriam-Webster, n.d. Web. 17 Apr. 2018.
Rodríguez, Teresa, Diana Montané and Lisa Pulitzer. The Daughters of Juárez: A True
Story of Serial Murder South of the Border. Atria Books, 2008.
Sandoval, Apolonio, Jr., and Steve Taylor. “Miller: NAFTA Renegotiations Should Be
Wrapped up in next Couple of Weeks.” Rio Grande Guardian, 2 May 2018,
riograndeguardian.com/miller-nafta-renegotiations-should-be-wrapped-up-innext-couple-of-weeks/.
Villarreal, M. Angeles. “Mexico’s Free Trade Agreements.” Mexico: Background and
Issues, by Richard C. Bradley, Nova Science, 2011, pp. 111-128.
Villarreal, M. Angeles. “U.S.-Mexico Economic Relations: Trends, Issues, and
Implications.” Mexico: Background and Issues, by Richard C. Bradley, Nova
Science, 2011, pp. 35-56.

Molinaro 37
VIII. Appendix
1. “Who does Mexico export to?” (2016)

https://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/visualize/tree_map/sitc/export/mex/show/all/2016/

2. “Who does Mexico import from?” (2016)
https://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/visualize/tree_map/sitc/import/mex/show/all/2016/
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3. “What does Mexico export?” (2016)
https://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/visualize/tree_map/hs92/export/mex/all/show/2016/

4. “What does Mexico import?” (2016)
https://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/visualize/tree_map/hs92/import/mex/all/show/2016/
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5. Country Comparison – the United States vs. Mexico
https://www.hofstede-insights.com/country-comparison/mexico,the-usa/

